Research

My current research focuses mainly on moral psychology themes, specifically responsibility, reactive attitudes, and fittingness of emotions. I also wrote on topics like moral motivation, moral worth, axiological values, and formal epistemology.

My master's thesis - advised by Rocco Chirivì - was on a new foundation of mathematics, based on HoTT (homotopy type theory, viz. higher-order grupoids) and the Univalent Axiom.

Dissertation

"The Triangle of Innocence"

What do the status of being a victim, the emotional reaction of sympathy and the speech act of complaint have in common? They all require one to be innocent. Being a victim is a matter of being wronged or innocently harmed. Being sympathetic, viz. worthy of sympathy, is a matter of being a victim. Being able to issue a valid complaint depends on one's entitlement to the sympathy one is after. Can you spot the triangle?

What is revealed is that only victims can issue a valid complaint and seek fitting sympathy in doing so.

Gathering my thoughts at sunset in Santa Caterina - definitely couldn't complain back then!

Currently Under Review (email me for a draft)

A paper on moral experts

(earlier version presented at the Davis-Standford-Berkeley Grad Conference)

According to some, moral experts have to be more knowledgeable than any other moral agent on any moral matter, for one to be justified in deferring and acquiring moral knowledge via testimony. I argue that this view of moral expertise is unnecessarily undemanding, as moral expertise is a comparative and relative notion.

A paper that contrasts fitting blame with standingless blame

(earlier version presented at the Central APA)

Standingless blame could be regarded as also unfitting, insofar as it misrepresents the blamer as someone committed to the norms they are reproaching the blamee for violating them. However, the force of standingless blame seems to be, ceteris paribus, stronger than blame that is unfitting because an innocent is being blamed. Can this feature also being cashed out as at a representational level?

A paper on the moral worth of an action

Committing to either a Kantian or a Humean view of moral worth is not always the best choice - I argue that moral worth is a multi-dimensional concept and each view can account for one dimension only. The moral worth of an action results from a holistic evaluation.

A paper on the properties of the relation "be better than"

It looks like this relation is transitive, but this claim has been objected to. I claim that it can meet the objections raised.

A paper on motivation De Dicto

Tale as old as the "Moral Problem": acting on a de dicto motivation is regarded as manifestly fetishist. But is it so obvious that is?

A winter scene from Otranto - can I complain that is not like this when packed with vacationers over the summer months?

Works in Progress (email me for a draft)

A paper on the concept of victimhood

Victims occupy a key role in our moral, political, and social practices; yet, a full-fledged account of victimhood is lurking in philosophy. I propose a disjunctive account: a victim is someone who has been wronged or innocently harmed. I show that this account is enough to explain the normative footprint of victimhood. Also, the two disjuncts are unified by the fact that victims only are the proper objects of sympathy.

A paper on the functions of complaint

People complain about many, different things - e.g. the weather, the traffic, being treated unfairly, being scammed - to both people who are morally responsible and to people who have nothing to do with the object of their complaint. I argue that complaint is a speech act whose main function is not that of requesting redress, but that of soliciting sympathy in the addressee. Sympathy is the emotional experience that is apt to have toward people who are innocent victims.

A paper on prudential responsibility

Philosophers have been studying under which conditions someone is to be held morally responsible and what is the proper reaction to have toward them (i.e. blame) for decades. But little has been said regarding a sister form of responsibility, that by which the agent doens't violate a moral norm, but a prudential one. What norms govern the ascription of prudential responsibility? And what reaction is it appropriate to hold, on the part of the agent and of the audience?

A view of Castro Marina - my only complaint is that it is too ...[insert a relevant negative adjective if you can]